Gregor Gysi: The Best Chancellor Germany Never Had

Why Friedrich Merz Is Sealing Germany’s Coffin

Recently, Gregor Gysi made an observation that deserves far more attention than it has received. According to Gysi, Friedrich Merz’s political strategy is increasingly based on finding new groups of people to blame for Germany’s socio-economic problems rather than confronting the deeper causes of the country’s decline.

First it was immigrants and refugees.

Then it was the healthcare system.

Now it is Germany’s workforce.

Whether one agrees with Gregor Gysi on everything or not, his criticism exposes a troubling pattern. Whenever Germany faces a serious challenge, Merz appears more interested in identifying a convenient target than offering either a compelling vision for the future or consistent decisions aligned with clear political and ethical values.

The Refugees Who Helped Germany

Germany welcomed around one million refugees during the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016. The decision was controversial then and remains controversial today, stoked up by the nationalism of the AfD.

Yet ten years later, many of these refugees have integrated successfully. They have learned German, entered the labour market, started businesses, paid taxes, contributed to the pension system and become part of German society.

Some arrived as highly qualified professionals: doctors, engineers, academics and lawyers. Others filled essential jobs that Germany struggles to recruit for itself.

Germany’s demographic crisis is not a future problem. It is happening now. Employers across the country face labour shortages. The pension system depends on a shrinking workforce supporting a growing retired population.

Against this background, treating refugees primarily as a burden rather than as contributors makes little economic sense.

I recently thought of a young Syrian woman I know. She now speaks fluent German, as well as English and Arabic. She is completing a doctorate in law and has every prospect of becoming a highly productive member of German society.

Yet she is planning her future elsewhere, most likely in the United States.

Germany invested in her integration. Germany benefited from her talent. Germany may now lose her altogether.

That is not a success story. It is a failure of political imagination.

Scapegoating Healthcare

The same pattern appears in healthcare.

Germany undoubtedly faces major financial pressures in its health and social insurance systems. An ageing population, rising costs and economic stagnation create genuine challenges.

But the answer cannot simply be to reduce protections that millions of people rely upon.

The principle that families should have access to healthcare regardless of income has long been one of the strengths of the German social model. Weakening that principle may save money in the short term, but it risks creating greater social and economic costs in the future.

What is particularly striking is the contrast between the urgency applied to military spending and the hesitation shown towards investments in social infrastructure.

Politicians readily describe defence spending as an investment in the future. Yet healthcare, education and social stability are investments too.

A nation is not defended only by weapons. It is defended by healthy, educated and confident citizens.

The Myth of Working Longer

The latest target appears to be Germany’s workforce.

Merz has argued that Germans need to work more hours and remain economically active for longer. On the surface, this sounds practical and responsible.

In reality, it reflects a remarkably outdated understanding of productivity.

Human beings are not machines.

Productivity depends upon motivation, trust, leadership, skills, technology and working conditions. A well-managed and valued employee working thirty-five hours per week can often contribute more than an exhausted and disengaged employee working fifty-five.

The most successful economies do not necessarily have the longest working weeks. They have the most productive working hours.

Germany’s challenge is not primarily that its people are lazy. It is that investment in digitalisation, reducing bureaucracy, promoting infrastructure and innovation has lagged behind many competitors for years.

Blaming workers is easier than fixing structural problems. But it is also less effective.

Germany Needs Leadership, Not Scapegoats

Friedrich Merz undoubtedly possesses ambition. He looks like a statesman. He speaks confidently. He projects authority.

Yet genuine leadership requires more than authority.

It requires empathy.

It requires vision.

It requires values.

The CDU once prided itself on balancing economic responsibility with social responsibility. Today, that balance often seems absent. The willingness to embrace large-scale borrowing while simultaneously questioning social protections creates the impression not of strategic thinking but of political inconsistency.

Germany faces enormous challenges: demographic decline, economic stagnation, digital backwardness, labour shortages and growing political polarisation.

None of these problems will be solved by blaming refugees, healthcare recipients or workers.

They require something much rarer.

They require a government willing to unite rather than divide.

For all his political flaws, Gregor Gysi has long understood one simple truth: a society becomes stronger when it expands the circle of belonging rather than narrowing it. He truly is the best chancellor Germany never had.

Germany’s future will depend on whether more of its leaders understand that truth as well.

“When five people own more wealth than the poorer half of an entire nation, the problem is not refugees, nurses or workers. The problem is where the wealth has gone.”
— Gregor Gysi (paraphrased from his speeches on wealth inequality)

Sovereignty Begins at the Desktop

Linux desktop workspace representing digital sovereignty, privacy and independence from big tech ecosystems

For years, choosing an operating system was treated as a consumer preference: Mac or Windows. Apple or Microsoft. Design or compatibility.

Those days are ending. Indeed, for me, they have already ended.

My move to Linux was not born of practicality. It began as an explicitly political decision: a small personal protest against what I see as the increasingly troubling direction of the United States and my growing discomfort about privacy and with Europe’s dependence on American technology.

What began as principle, however, quickly became something more exciting. An education, even.

In moving away from mainstream platforms, I discovered not merely a political statement but a better way of computing: faster, calmer, less intrusive, more user-controlled—and one that forced me to confront how casually many of us have entrusted vast quantities of personal data to a handful of foreign corporations.

Increasingly, our technology choices are no longer merely about convenience or aesthetics. They are about jurisdiction, sovereignty, dependence and trust.

The Illusion of Neutral Technology

We have spent two decades pretending that software is apolitical. It is not.

Private data is the so-called new oil.
Cloud platforms are geopolitical assets.
Operating systems are instruments of jurisdiction.
App ecosystems are channels of dependency.

To build one’s digital life entirely on American platforms is not simply to use foreign products. It is to place one’s communications, workflows, data and habits inside systems governed elsewhere.

For years, this dependency seemed harmless because America appeared stable, predictable and aligned with European interests. That assumption now looks far less secure.

Why Linux Appeals Beyond the Technically Curious

My own switch to Linux was motivated initially by principle, but sustained by practical reality.

Linux is, quite simply, excellent.

It offers:

    • greater speed and efficiency
    • far less software bloat
    • more user control
    • minimal intrusive advertising or telemetry
    • freedom from forced ecosystem lock-in
    • a calmer, more focused computing experience

It also avoids a growing trend I find exhausting in mainstream software: the transformation of operating systems into hyperactive consumer platforms.

Notifications.
Recommendations.
Prompts.
Pop-ups.
Embedded AI assistants.
Animated interfaces designed less for work than for perpetual engagement.

Linux, by contrast, still feels like a tool. Not a theme park.

My Preferred Distributions: Mint and Arch

For those exploring Linux, I find two distributions particularly compelling.

Linux Mint: Mature Practicality

Mint is Linux at its most civilised.

Stable, polished, intuitive and highly accessible, it offers a reassuringly traditional desktop experience without sacrificing elegance.

It is the Linux distribution I would recommend to most ordinary users and beginners.

Arch Linux: Radical User Ownership

Arch is a different philosophy entirely.

Minimal, modular and deeply configurable, it demands more of the user—but rewards that effort with extraordinary control.

Arch is not merely software.

It is a statement of intent:

I will shape my tools. My tools will not shape me.

Europe Is Beginning to Think This Way Too

What may once have looked like niche hobbyism is increasingly becoming state policy.

The French government has announced plans to migrate large parts of its public administration away from Windows and toward Linux as part of a broader digital sovereignty strategy.

Other European administrations are exploring or implementing similar moves, including regional and national migrations toward open-source alternatives in Germany and Denmark.

Why?

Because governments are recognising what individuals increasingly recognise:

Dependency creates vulnerability.

Reliance on foreign proprietary platforms means reliance on:

    • foreign licensing decisions
    • foreign corporate roadmaps
    • foreign legal jurisdictions
    • foreign political stability

The Great Irony: Linux Already Runs the World

Here is the part casual users often miss: Linux may still be niche on consumer desktops, but it already powers much of the digital world.

Linux runs:

    • most of the web’s server infrastructure
    • the overwhelming majority of supercomputers globally
    • vast portions of cloud computing infrastructure
    • countless embedded and industrial systems
    • even Android is based on a modified version of the Linux kernel

In other words:

Linux is not an outsider technology.

It is the backbone of modern computing.

The desktop is merely catching up.

A Warning to America — And An Opportunity for Europe

The United States should not assume technological dominance is permanent.

Consumers, institutions and governments are increasingly asking difficult questions:

    • Who controls our infrastructure?
    • Who governs our data?
    • What happens if political alignment breaks?
    • Why are we so dependent on foreign platforms for essential digital life?

If American tech firms continue to treat lock-in as strategy and complacency as entitlement, they may discover that dominance breeds resistance.

Meanwhile Europe has an opportunity.

Not necessarily to replace Silicon Valley overnight.

But to build credible alternatives.

To invest in open standards.
To support interoperable software.
To back European cloud and software infrastructure.
To treat digital autonomy as seriously as energy autonomy.

The next decade may not produce a mass exodus from American technology.

But the direction of travel is becoming harder to ignore.

Slowly, unevenly, but unmistakably.

Final Thought

My move to Linux will not alter geopolitics.

But it is, in its own small way, an expression of a wider conviction:

That technology should serve its user.
That infrastructure should remain contestable.
That dependency should never become invisible.

Linux is not merely for hobbyists anymore.

It is increasingly for those asking a larger question:

Who should control the tools on which modern life depends?

“In times of change, the learners inherit the earth, while the learned find themselves beautifully equipped for a world that no longer exists.”
Eric Hoffer

Social Media Bans for Under 16s

Why banning social media for under-16s may feel right — but fails to address the real issue

There is a growing political appetite to ban social media for under-16s. Governments in countries such as Australia and Indonesia have already moved in this direction, driven by rising concern about anxiety, depression, and the psychological effects of digital life.

The instinct is understandable. But it may also be wrong.

The comfort of the ban

A ban is politically attractive because it is clear, decisive and easy to communicate. It signals protection. It tells a worried public that something is being done.

But it also avoids a harder question.

Why has social media become so central to childhood in the first place?

Policy without evidence

The Cambridge psychologist Sander van der Linden has been unusually blunt. There is, he argues, “zero empirical evidence” that banning social media for teenagers improves outcomes.

His warning is not ideological but methodological:

“Blindly instituting wholesale bans for teens takes the ‘evidence’ out of evidence-based policy.”

This matters. Because once policy is driven primarily by anxiety, it becomes vulnerable to simplification.

And simplification is exactly what this issue does not need.

The variability problem

Social media does not affect all children in the same way.

For some, it amplifies vulnerability: comparison, exclusion, anxiety.
For others, it provides connection, identity and support. As well as of course access to information for school work.

The outcome depends on:

    • personality
    • patterns of use
    • existing mental health
    • social environment

A blanket ban assumes uniform harm where there is, in reality, radical variation.

The misdiagnosis

More fundamentally, a ban risks targeting the wrong thing.

The problem is not simply that children use social media. It is that social media have been designed to capture attention:

    • infinite scroll
    • algorithmic reinforcement
    • intermittent rewards

These are not neutral features. They are behavioural systems.

Yet instead of regulating the environment, we regulate the child.

We restrict the user because we do not confront the system.

The illusion of control

Even on practical grounds, bans are fragile.

    • Teenagers will bypass them
    • Peer groups will remain online
    • The demand for connection will persist
    • Evidence shows that the dangers are greater once hidden underground

The behaviour does not disappear. It relocates. More importantly, a ban does not teach navigation. It postpones exposure.

From protection to preparation

Van der Linden’s alternative is not permissiveness, but preparation:

    • early digital literacy
    • gradual exposure
    • critical thinking
    • resilience

In short:

Not protection through restriction, but protection through competence.

The question beneath the question

But even this may not be the deepest layer because the focus on social media obscures a more uncomfortable possibility.

Over recent decades, childhood has changed:

    • less independent movement
    • less unsupervised play
    • more adult control
    • more structured time

Children are safer, and yet less free.

We did not simply give children smartphones.
We removed much of the world they would otherwise have enjoyed.

Social media did not replace childhood.
In some respects, it stepped into a space that had already been narrowed.

Conclusion

The case for concern about social media is strong.
The case for banning it is not.

As Sander van der Linden argues, policy should be guided by evidence, not urgency or political posturing. At present, the evidence for bans is thin, while the complexity of the problem is substantial.

If we want children to spend less time online, we will have to do something more difficult than passing laws.

We will have to ask what kind of childhood we are willing to allow.

“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive.”              – C.S. Lewis

The Myth of Powerlessness

What one person cannot do alone — and what millions can still do together.

In a time of escalating global conflict and war, many people are asking the same question: what can one individual actually do?

Almost everyone I speak to says the same thing. On trains. In cafés. On the street. Among friends.

“Nothing.”

What can I do? I am one person. One voter. One consumer. One voice. The machine is too big. The war is too far away. The system is too entrenched.

It sounds like realism. But it is something closer to resignation.

At the time of writing, this is not an abstract question. The United States and Israel are engaged in a widening military campaign across Iran and the region, with consequences already extending into Lebanon and beyond. Civilian infrastructure has been hit. Escalation remains a real possibility. The language of expansion and power is no longer confined to the margins.

And yet, in the face of all this, the most common response remains the same: there is nothing I can do.

No one person can stop a war alone. That is true. But it does not follow that one person has nothing to do. It only means that conscience must become collective before it becomes consequential.

Every system of violence depends not only on leaders, generals, and ideologues, but on millions of smaller permissions: purchases, habits, silences, career calculations, and the daily decision to do nothing because doing something feels futile. That is where power really sits.

We do not have to look far, in my adotped country, to see both what passive compliance can enable and what collective refusal can undo.

Where pressure comes from

We tend to imagine power as something distant: governments, armies, corporations. And of course, it is. But it is also embedded in the ordinary flows that sustain those systems: money, attention, legitimacy, cooperation.

Remove enough of those, and even large structures begin to strain.

As Charles Eisenstein has argued, modern systems are often more fragile than they appear. Confidence depends on participation. Withdraw participation at scale, and the system feels it.

The point is not that one person can bring about collapse. The point is that systems depend on millions of people continuing to cooperate. Which means that non-cooperation matters too.

Not expression, but leverage

Much of what passes for protest today is expressive. It allows us to signal disapproval, to feel aligned, to release moral tension. But expression is not the same as pressure.

Pressure is slower, less visible, and more demanding. It involves changing behaviour, not just declaring opinion. It involves cost.

If anything is to change, the question is not what we feel, but what we are prepared to do differently.

What can actually be done

None of what follows is dramatic. That is precisely the point. These are actions available to ordinary people, within the law, that become powerful only when they are repeated, shared, and sustained.

Speak clearly

Not “this is terrible.” Say what you oppose, what you want changed, and who has the power to act. Silence is easy to ignore. Clarity is not.

Write, then write again

One message can be dismissed. Patterns cannot. Ask for a position, not a platitude. Follow up.

Use money deliberately

Reconsider where you bank. Review what your investments support. Cancel subscriptions tied to companies you wish to avoid. Move spending where you can. Systems built on constant inflow notice outflow.

Recently, after 20 years of brand loyalty, I shut down my Apple eco-system. I now use European-based Proton Mail, Calendar and Drive and I write using Linux Mint and open source software. I’ve discovered that I am not alone.

Boycott with focus

Vague refusal achieves little. Targeted, visible refusal accumulates. Choose specific companies or sectors. Be consistent. Make your reasons public.

Pressure the institutions around you

Your university, your workplace, your church, your professional body. Ask what they fund, who they partner with, what position they take.

Institutions prefer neutrality. Pressure forces articulation.

Organise—and keep going

Movements rarely begin large. They begin with a handful of people who decide to act together and to continue acting.

Continuity matters more than size.

Show up

Demonstrations are not sufficient, but they are not meaningless. Presence, visibility, repetition—these change the atmosphere in which decisions are made.

Support truth and relief

Support serious journalism, legal work and humanitarian organisations. Wars continue more easily when they are obscured.

Turn agreement into action

Agreement has no effect until it is organised. Exchange names. Set a date. Do one thing. Repeat.

What this requires

None of this is easy.

It requires persistence rather than intensity. Discipline rather than outrage. Coordination rather than isolation.

It also requires something else: the refusal to adopt the logic of the thing one opposes.

If protest becomes only anger, only dehumanisation, only the search for enemies, it begins to mirror the structure it resists. The aim is not to reverse roles within the same system, but to alter the system itself.

It is easier to argue about geopolitics than to examine the small ways in which we continue to cooperate with it.

That is slower work. But it is more durable.

Conclusion

No one person can stop a war.

But wars do not continue by themselves. They continue because millions of ordinary people, in thousands of small ways, continue to cooperate with the systems that sustain them.

Withdraw enough of that cooperation — financially, politically, socially, publicly — and pressure begins to build.

The question is not whether you can do everything.

It is whether you are willing to do something.

And whether enough of us are willing to do it together.

“The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be either good or evil.”
Hannah Arendt